Foreign Policy Autonomy under Debt: How Chinese Loans Affect Africa’s International Bargaining Power

Abstract

This paper looks at how Chinese loans affect Africa’s ability to set its own foreign policy, using dependency theory as the main framework. The study argues that while Chinese funding gives African countries important resources for infrastructure and development, it also creates a dependence that affects their international bargaining power. Three key mechanisms are identified: financial dependence and contractual governance, which allow creditor influence over fiscal and policy decisions and limit independent action; commodity lock-in through resource-backed loans (RBLs), which tie national revenue streams to paying off debt; and strategic reciprocity in diplomacy, where financial support is linked to aligning foreign policy. Notable examples from Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Zambia, Ghana, and Ethiopia show how debt obligations affect political decisions, voting patterns in international forums, infrastructure ownership, and access to other funding sources. The paper also acknowledges the agency of African states, noting that they can use competition among creditors, build diverse partnerships, and negotiate better terms. However, their autonomy depends on transparency, coherent creditor coordination, and strong domestic debt management systems. The findings highlight that while Chinese loans can provide a way to advance development, they may also limit foreign policy choices when debt becomes unmanageable. Recommendations include improving transparency in debt contracts, creating stronger frameworks for debt sustainability, reducing reliance on resource-backed loans, enhancing domestic revenue collection, and promoting collective negotiation within regional groups. The study concludes that balancing development needs with sovereignty requires careful financial governance, which makes dependency theory a useful tool for understanding Africa’s bargaining position under debt.