

The Developmental State Perspective: Relevance for Uganda's Post-Independence Political Economic Crises

By

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Abstract

The paper discusses Uganda's political and economic circumstances while providing lessons from the viewpoint of a developing state. It takes into account the decolonization phase that followed independence and explains why Uganda, like other newly industrialized nations, never took the developmental state path as a means of quick and simple development. On the other hand, did Uganda still achieve the same results as nations like Malaysia and Taiwan, for example, or was there a lag that may have been caused by the developmental state perspective that was adopted by nations like those of East Asia, which are now regarded as states that perform like miracles. Uganda's triumph in gaining independence occurred in a highly challenging political and economic situation, hence from this point forward. Since (October 9, 1962), the state has gone through a number of crises, the effects of which cannot be overstated. This perspective as worked for countries especially the East Asian states however, the adoption of the same perspective in Africa has been questioned and there is even a debate as to whether the absence of the same is what accounts for our development statuses in Africa or not.

Keywords: Development, State, Developmental States, Inclusive Development, New Developmental States, Patrimonialism

Introduction

Different concepts have been used to define the term "developmental state," and usage tends to be location- and time-dependent. The phrase "government led growth and development" is used to describe nations like Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Viet Nam. It describes a state with a government-led approach to growth and development that includes thorough strategic planning while utilizing available resources to ensure the welfare of the populace, which is reflected in lower costs and higher living standards. Academics and politicians have

both used term to refer to a considerably broader set of nations, and this study will later examine a broader swath of such disparate ideas.

Whereas it is a responsibility of the state to ensure growth and development, not all states and governments do it and this has been reflected in form of social, political and economic crises and thus puts questions on the hitherto expected social democracy¹ which is an indicator of how people's expectations are met by state and government (Sandbrook et al. 2007) whereas this writeup is a broad review of the literature there is a regional bias in the paper towards Asia and. Literature from outside these regions has not been ignored but has not been explored in as much depth.

Therefore, much more could have been said about Latin America's more recent experiences with developing states than could be covered here, as well as regarding Europe's historical experience with them (see: List, 1904; Gregor 1979).

Exploring the Ugandan Case:

In order to fulfill a deadline of October 9, 1962, negotiators had to move quickly on a number of crucial topics at the birth of Uganda as an independent country. Some analysts contend that because Uganda gained independence quickly, the post-independence period has been hampered by negotiations' obligations and omissions. We should keep in mind that, generally speaking, British policy was to establish a federation of territories or maintain nations' integrity upon independence, eliminating any possibility of secession, as occurred in Belgian Congo. Others, such as Nigeria, were kept as federal states. Sudan was kept as a single country despite the fact that its northern and southern halves shared very little. And in Uganda, a compromise constitution was widely adopted to keep Uganda as one country.

¹ Social democracy is a political, social and economic ideology that supports economic and social interventions to promote social justice within the framework of a capitalist economy, as well as a policy regime involving a commitment to representative democracy, measures for income redistribution, and regulation of the economy in the general interest and welfare state provisions.

This was a difficult time. Since their only goal is to provide information for this study, they can be summed up as follows and are not investigated in detail.

- i. The first obstacle was the resentment that Protestants had evidently fostered with the assistance of the Church of England, which led to the formation of a coalition between the Protestant-based UPC and the Protestant-based KY with the express intention of defeating the Protestant-based DP.
- i. The 1962 elections, according to Catholics, were planned to deny DP victory in the 1961 elections.
- ii. A reminder of their setback before to colonization was provided by their 1962 religious setback. Strange bedfellows were formed by the desire to overthrow Kiwanuka, a Catholic commoner, and his party. Together with radical and left-wing politicians from the rest of the nation, Obote, a commoner from the north, united monarchist and conservative right-wing representatives from Buganda.
- iii. In order to avoid becoming involved in a contentious political situation, Britain hurried Uganda's independence. This was due to the post-independence political unrest in Sudan, the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya, the social revolution in Rwanda that resulted in a large influx of refugees and livestock into Uganda, the assassination of the prime minister-designate of Burundi by a Greek hired assassin, the post-independence political chaos in the former Belgian Congo,
- iv. In a hastily passed unworkable constitution, Buganda was given a federal status, while Ankole, Bunyoro, and Toro were given semi-federal status and the remainder were given unitary status. Britain had insisted on a unitary constitution up until a very late stage. The Munster Commission² on Relationship between Buganda and the rest of Uganda changed that position. The Commission considered many factors in and around Uganda. The political chaos in Congo influenced the final recommendation.

² The Munster Commission recommended that Buganda's separatist demands should be incorporated in the Constitution as some sort of federal arrangement. In this regard The Munster Commission envisaged a Uganda consisting of a federal Buganda, and semi-federal Toro, Ankole, and Bunyoro.

- v. Districts administered by a unitary system immediately discovered they were losing out on the advantages of power sharing under federal and semi-federal arrangements as the imbalances in federal, semi-federal, and unitary systems quickly became felt. .
- vi. Uganda entered independence without agreeing on what to call the new nation. It was neither a monarchy nor a republic; neither a federation nor a unitary state.
- vii. Because the negotiators were in a hurry, they couldn't agree on who should become the head of state. In the interim it was agreed that the Queen should continue as head of state represented by the Governor-General.
- viii. Before independence, Amin had committed war crimes and crimes against humanity as a soldier in Uganda King's Rifles operating in Kenya. The Kenyan authorities wanted Amin face criminal charges.

On top of these, there were other issues that were not resolved.

1. Batutsi/Bahororo of Ankole who had kept a low profile since their short-lived Mpororo kingdom³ disintegrated in mid 18th century, sprang up during independence negotiations and demanded a separate district out of Ankole kingdom.
2. The Rwenzururu problem was not resolved. Bakonjo and Baamba who were incorporated into Toro kingdom at the time of colonization against their will claimed they were underdeveloped while heavily taxed. They further claimed that they were virtually excluded from the administration.
3. The Mbale controversy was also left unresolved. A commission of inquiry suggested altering boundaries to give the people of Bukedi direct access to Mbale, while giving nominal title to the town to Bugisu.

³ The Kingdom of Mpororo dates back in 1650 and was established by great men of the past. Mpororo's first King; Omukama Kamurari was enthroned followed by Omukama Muntu, Kazi, Karagaire, Muzooro, Ntagu, Kinwa and Kamurara II. In 1753 Prince Kahaya Rutindangyezi Rwa Murorwa fought his brother Omukama Kamurari II and took over the throne. This resulted in the disintegration of the Kingdom of Mpororo and six (6) states emerged from the greater Mpororo Kingdom all led by Kahaya Rutindangyezi's sons.

These changes influenced the political and constitutional turmoil that led to the republic constitution's adoption in place of the independence constitution. A clear examination of Uganda's economy reveals that it has been experiencing economic difficulties that have necessitated learning from other nations who were in a similar stage of growth throughout the post-colonial era. If the developmental state approach is to make sense to a nation like Uganda, this is a defense of a course of action.

The Developmental States explored:

The notion of the developmental state as a whole, as well as scholarly analysis of developmental states in East and South East Asia and their experiences, have typically placed a new focus on the role of the state in attaining economic growth and poverty reduction. This emphasis on the crucial part played by the state in promoting economic growth runs counter to the neo-liberal, market-based presumptions that many development players had been working with. These neoliberal views saw the state as part of the problem and tried to lower its size and influence in order for development to take off, as opposed to seeing the state as the agent that could act to promote growth.

The question of whether and how states should participate in the market and what role they should play in development has been one of the main topics of discussion surrounding developmental states (White and Wade 1988). Johnson (1999) addresses how the Japanese experience he presented was "inconvenient" for both sides of the ideological cold war split and recalls the animosity with which Anglo-American economists responded to his idea of a developmental state (p. 34). (p.49). Although the significance of the states' involvement has increasingly come to be accepted, the nature of this role is still being debated (Kohli 1994, p.1269). The question is not how much state interference, but rather "what kind of state intervention," as Evans (1995:75) writes in his seminal book on embedded autonomy.

A State defined:

It is crucial to establish a state at the outset. For the fields of politics, international relations, political sociology, as well as development studies, the concept of the state is of utmost importance (amongst others). Therefore, it is perhaps inevitable that it will also be hotly debated.

Since "fifty years of asking the issue [what is the state] have not generated any very good or even broadly acknowledged responses," I do not seek to resolve these arguments and offer a definitive response in this brief introduction (Abrams 1988:59). There has not been any revolutionary breakthrough on this topic in the roughly 20 years since the publication of Abrams' article, *Developmental States: a survey of the literature*. However, Weber's conceptualization of the state is widely used as a starting point for discussions on the question of the state.

A human society that "effectively claims the monopoly of the use of physical force within a particular territory" is how Weber described the state (Weber 1991:78).

Aspects of this concept are considered to be extremely crucial for current discussions regarding state capacity, which frequently focus on the inability of the declared states to successfully assert their monopoly over the use of force, or at least to do so across their whole declared area. However, Weber's definition does not provide clear advice on topics like where society ends and the state begins. It also acknowledges that there are factions within a state while attributing the monopoly of violence to a "human community" (Weber 1991:78). The reason for this, in my opinion, is that Weber believed that there were various types of dominance or authority (*Herrschaft*), and that the state was a relationship of "men dominating men" (although given my own preference for including Women as political actors, perhaps we can think of it as "people dominating people") (Weber 1991:78; Weber 1978).

The lines between "state" and "society" drawn by these diverse types of dominance or authority are not always the same, nor do they pursue the same objectives or carry out the same functions (Weber 1991:78; Weber 1978). The state-society divide, however, is frequently viewed as crucial by many political scholars while being perceived as fundamentally muddled or nonexistent by thinkers like Althusser and Gramsci (Cohen and Arato 1994:159; Trouillot 2001:127). The state-society divide was at the center of what Hobson calls "the first state debate" in international politics, which pitted proponents of a "state-centric" problem against those propounding a "society-centric" problem. However, Hobson believes that this debate has been significantly advanced by a focus on "how state structures and social forces mutually constitute each other" (Hobson 2001:396).

Timothy Mitchell emphasizes the fact that the formation of state-society and state-market disparities is about the establishment and upkeep of a specific order, which is the relevance of these distinctions (Mitchell 2006:175). The normative recommendations and theoretical presumptions about state and society that have dominated development theory's concepts of the state can be understood as having been molded by this initial state debate and the larger ideological political arguments it fed into (Petiteville,1998). The developmental states literature, which has a tendency to have a state-centric focus and assume a boundary without much interrogation, may benefit from the more recent shift towards considering the complex mutual constitution of state and society and the way in which the production of this boundary is about the maintenance of a particular order.

The term "state" is undoubtedly much debated. However, for the sake of clarity in this essay, "the state" often refers to something that is more than just governance but does not include the entirety of a nation (Trouillot 2001:127). The executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the state, as well as bureaucratic functions and ministries, are included in the emerging conception of the state in the literature on the developmental state. The state is seen as something beyond simple government with distinct if hazy boundaries (cf. Gupta 1995). In this understanding of the state, business, civil society, and political society are not considered to be components of society. Understanding the relationship between the state and the community helps one to get a feel of a developmental state, and thus their success often being seen to rest on a very particular form of state-society relations that Evans terms embedded autonomy (1995).

Development re-conceptualised:

Growth and development are supposed to be the results of such a situation, but this must be done with a clear grasp of what is meant by development. It is extremely debatable what constitutes a developmental outcome. Surprisingly, there hadn't been much discussion of it in the literature on developmental states up until lately. According to the material that is currently available, developmental states are primarily linked to welfare, growth, and economic development (Mkandawire, 2001). Many a time, the problem is that it was 'economic growth that was seen to have other social benefits and the concept of a developmental state is often used to denote not

states which have achieved significant growth rates but rather growth rates alongside with a perception of reasonably wide spread legitimacy as noted in Leftwich (2000:166-167)

Scholars have highlighted that there has generally been significant increases in the standard of living for a large number of the population in developmental states (Johnson 1987:143 and Leftwich 2008:16). The legitimacy⁴ of developmental states rested on these significant improvements in standards of living for a broad cross section of society, and is also seen to be a significant element of developmental states (Wade 1990:7; Fritz and Menocal 2007:534; Lin and Monga 2011:278). Therefore, growth, with widespread increases in the standard of living (through increasing employment and industrialisation in the case of East Asia and Mauritius) and broad-based legitimacy, was the core aspect of the developmental outcomes for much of the developmental states research. Scholars have diverse priorities when it comes to these many factors, and they frequently concentrate on different aspects at different times, such as growth, living standards, and legitimacy.

However, political repressive regimes and the exclusion of some communities have frequently coexisted with these progressive components (Leftwich 1995:418-419 ;). Despite the fact that developmental governments have frequently had human rights records that are generally favorable (or at least not horrendously awful) (Leftwich 1995:418-419). Therefore, developmental states wouldn't entirely satisfy ESIDs. An international collaboration called the Effective States and Inclusive Development (ESID) Research Centre is looking into the political structures that support development. The research, which is supported by DFID, spans 16 nations and has collaborators in Bangladesh, Ghana, India, Malawi, Rwanda, South Africa, Uganda, and the United States. ESID is improving people's lives and livelihoods by advancing our understanding of governance in the developing world in ways that have an influence on policy and practice development that is inclusively minded. Later in the review we will return to the

⁴ In political science, legitimacy is the right and acceptance of an authority, usually a governing law or a régime. The term "legitimacy" denotes a *system* of government – wherein "government" denotes "sphere of influence"

tension between these developmental outcomes and ESID's concern with inclusive development, and to the work of scholars whose concepts of what kind of developmental state is needed in the future focuses on different understandings of developmental outcomes (Sandbrook et al. 2007; Evans 2010; 2011). Development for most of our states has been seen in terms of social and economic aspects but yet it far goes beyond such aspects to examine the presence as well as who has access to what and why the variation.

Numerous academics have attempted to define and provide a fresh conceptualization of the idea of a developmental state, but this has largely been "in response to their explorations of the economic growth stories of countries in South East Asia, and this particular experience has tended to dominate the framing of the concept" (Johnson 1982; 1987 and Evans 1995). Many states attempt to implement various development state models, however this is only an attempt. Political, social, and economic expressions must be enforced. This explains why political theorists are "more frequently connected with the first argument for the necessity of state-led growth, with Friedrich List providing the best example of these by arguing that Germany likes to lead the way in state-led development." (1988:1; Leftwich 2000:155; White and Wade 1988). This is due to the fact that Great Britain's expansion and growth throughout the late 1800s and early 1900s provided many other countries—both European and Asian, African, and Latin American countries—with a new model of a developing state. .

This suggests that because the East Asian "miracle" is so important to the literature on developmental states, a review of the topic should take into account the possibility of having many different interpretations of what constitutes a developmental state, how those countries arrived at their current status, and the lessons that other nations can learn from them. Johnson responds to this by pointing out that the idea also exists as an unspecific generality (Johnson 1999:43). The term "developmental state" in the abstract refers to the synthesis of each East Asian case's otherwise very specific details into a model or ideal type of the developmental state.

Johnson's own Japanese model⁵ was possibly the first of these typologies (Johnson 1982, pp. 305-324). The characteristics connected to different developmental states are not all exactly the same. However, one can sum up these characteristics as follows for the sake of this paper:

1. A competent, independent (but ingrained) bureaucracy (Evans, 1995).
2. Political leadership that is committed to development (Musamba, 2010; Fritz and Menocal 2007).
3. A close, frequently mutually beneficial partnership between important industry capitalists and select governmental institutions (commonly referred to as pilot agencies). (1982; 1987; Johnson).
4. Effective policy changes that encourage growth (Wade, 1990; Beeson, 2004).

In addition to the aforementioned, Vu's study (2007:38) introduces a crucial distinction between developmental structures and developmental functions, which one may argue is essential to understanding developmental states. In this situation, one may point out that a developmental state is one that has the capacity to fulfill developmental functions and also possesses developmental structures. In addition, several academics have also stressed the need of ability and leadership/vision working together (Fritz and Menocal, 2007).

To summarize,

“A developmental state is one that has the potential to be effective in its targeted sectors and has a vision for development that motivates it to use that capacity to promote economic growth”

This suggests that it plays developmental roles and has developmental patterns. Although this term is used in this context, there are various ways to think of the developmental state. The majority of the time, states that have been classified as developmental states have been able to achieve significant levels of growth.

⁵ Japan found itself at the end of World War II with a lot of its industrial infrastructure destroyed and many of its young adult population killed in the war. Not endowed with lots of industrial raw materials, its major remaining tradable economic asset was its labor power. It had other pluses. It had strong political cohesiveness, through the belief in the pivotal position of Japan in the world order and in the role of the Japanese emperor as the sole global mediator between the human and the divine. The pre-war industrial conglomerates (*zaibatsu*), although legally banned, survived in all but name in the now famous post-war *keiretsu*, so the country had experienced administrators.

On occasions, the main criterion used to classify developmental states is the degree of economic growth. This link between the state's structure and its subsequent success suggests that it is hard to identify developmental states prior to their attainment of successful growth (Fritz and Menocal 2007: 534).

Additionally, some academics have suggested that the phrases run the risk of being a tautology because the economy's performance frequently serves as evidence that the state is developing (Mkandawire 2001:290). He contends that for the phrase to have any meaning, the state must be capable of becoming developmental without experiencing economic growth as a result of unforeseeable external shocks (Mkandawire 2001). In other words, the prospect of failed developmental phases must exist. .

Developmental states' prerequisites are listed. States must first have developmental structures, and then they must play (or seek to play) developmental roles (Vu 2007:28). This successfully distinguishes between the capacity to carry out development strategies and the political will to support them. (Johnson 1999; Woo-Cummings 1999). However, a thorough investigation of developmental states must also focus on the developmental structures that each developmental state uses to function well. Together, these two components—structures and developmental commitment—are necessary. But the creation of effective states is thought to be a requirement for the growth of a developing state (Leftwich 2008, p.12). As Vu emphasizes using Indonesia as an example, attempts to carry out developmental duties will fail in the absence of state capacity (2007) .

Their capacity to "upgrade" is another feature used to distinguish developmental phases.

The ability to "upgrade from lower value to higher value economic activities" is cited by Doner, Ritchie, and Slater as the key characteristic that distinguished South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan as developmental states from the four high-growth ASEAN nations, namely Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia (2005:328). In a similar vein, one can concur with Evans' claim that the objectives of developmental states are to occupy better niches higher up in

the global division of labor hierarchy (1995:7-8) Although this definition can be used to illustrate the substantial benefits of upgrading, it also constricts the definition of the developing state.

Despite their expansion, nations like Botswana would not be considered to be developing by this criteria as they failed to diversify their economies, let alone "upgrade" (Taylor 2005:54). A large portion of the literature on developmental states investigates the paths that states have taken to become 'developmental' in order to uncover the crucial factors that made them successful. This raises the question of how states become developmental states. But we aren't just interested in their "success," which is frequently defined in terms of expansion. There are numerous paths to achieve economic growth (Williams et al. 2011), but in this case, we are interested in a specific path to growth or development known as the developmental state.

The major factors that review of literature identifies as necessary for a healthy developmental state to arise, however, remain tremendously diverse. The range of these interpretations certainly reflects the lack of agreement among scholars on the salient features of the paths taken by governments to become progressive, but it may also represent the variety of paths states have taken. These differing accounts frequently appear to come from the various case studies that are commonly referred to. For instance, a researcher who studied elite politics in South Korea and Indonesia (Vu, 2007) arrived at very different conclusions than one who looked at the formation of political coalitions in Botswana (Poteete, 2009).

On the other hand, it should be noted that these various analyses may also result from the interests, world views, models, and viewpoints of various scholars. While more recent research comparing additional nations (Kees van Donge et al. 2009) may help to move away from explanations that only apply in certain circumstances, they may miss some of the subtleties that thorough single case studies are able to provide light on.

Every scholar should be aware of this vulnerability.

This section outlines some of the factors that the literature has identified as crucial to the creation of developmental states. Numerous authors oppose single-cause theories, and they frequently

take into account how various factors interact and how two or more must be present. I apologize if my attempt to draw attention to these interactions and interdependencies by classifying the situations into several groups may have obscured any of their subtleties. Additionally, attempting to pinpoint the "cause"—or even the pair of factors or more—that when taken together account for East Asia's notable economic growth and state creations is perhaps an unnecessary undertaking. According to Pempel, "many forces triangulated to make the isolation of some one, super cause all but impossible," and that the region's economic expansion was, in fact, analytically "overdetermined." (1999:138). Sequencing in relation to the variables that affect the formation of a developmental state has been the subject of numerous inquiries.

For instance, colonialism is viewed as a foundational experience rather than a later quality from which various developmental states have emerged. The establishment of the industrial developmental nations of East Asia, which have come to be considered as the template of a developmental state, is also understood to be preceded by agricultural and land reform. Henry David, a different researcher, highlights the secondary significance of specific planning and can be viewed to emphasize the organic dependent character of how developmental states have arisen over a predetermined, planned set of stages. Regarding many of the characteristics of developing states that both produce and are produced by developmental states, such as a competent bureaucracy, embedded autonomy, or national project/state legitimacy, sequencing is also a challenging issue.

In other instances, Vu's research illustrates the significance of the pre-existence of specific state capacities and highlights how attempts to fulfill developmental tasks without the presence of developmental structures fail (Vu 2007). However, the availability of developmental structures, or what may be described as state capacity, but no desire to take on responsibilities that are developmental do not produce developmental outcomes (Vu 2007). The state's structures or capabilities to carry out developmental functions can be built by a developmental state drive, undercutting any straightforward sequential logic. This complicates the sequencing further.

Therefore, it is important to avoid reading the investigations of various conditions as a list of discrete alternative explanations or as a list of factors that interact in a predictable, sequential manner to produce discrete (and foreseeable) results. Instead, this is a summary of the numerous elements that the research has identified as being important for the establishment of developmental states. One should start by looking at some of the historical circumstances that have been suggested to have had an impact on the creation of the nations in East Asia, and then widen their investigation to include factors that have been identified as being especially significant to these states.

Lessons from Developmental States:

The spectacular and generally consistent growth records of East Asian developmental nations have generated curiosity in the applicability of this form of government to other emerging 'countries. There has been a concentrated effort to determine what may be learned from the East Asian experience, despite the tradeoffs that developmental states involve, which Vu stresses and suggests that "the experience of developing states may not be worth copying" (2007:49). (Wade, 1990; Evans, 1998; Williams et al. 2011; Hayashi, 2010). Because of the differences in numerous political, social, and economic issues, the majority of experts looking at the potential of transferring the progressive state model do not consider the transfer as a straightforward procedure. In addition, many academics question whether institutions and practices from developed states can be transferred to other states and "...the relevance of the East Asian 'developmental state' model for countries in Africa and elsewhere" (Williams et al. 2011:340).

It is important to take seriously Mkandawire and Musamba's rejection of the widespread denial of the potential emergence of developing states in Africa. Many of the problems and obstacles to the creation of developing governments, both in Africa and elsewhere, have significant support, though. Musamba provides a number of justifications offered by proponents of the impossibility theorem (2010:30-33). Using her summary as a guide, we can classify the arguments made about the challenges of applying the developmental state model into three main substantive strands.

1. The altered geopolitical environment (since East Asian governments began to emerge) and accelerated globalization African nations strive to advance right now. This thread observes that this is challenging due to the gaps in time and space.
2. The transfer of institutions is generally complicated. However, this aspect of the debate—which has been hinted at since the term was first used—concerns the general issue of transferring institutions from one environment to another and the uniqueness of the East Asian experience.
3. The absence of state capacity and developmental commitment in Africa⁶ and elsewhere. The strand I believe is incorrect to claim that developmental states cannot emerge because they are not doing so right now. The absence of state capacity and commitment, which are what constitute a developmental state, does not imply that they will not be present in the future because these processes take time. Of course, there are other countries in Africa and elsewhere that have promise in terms of their capacity and dedication; Lockwood cites Tanzania as one such country (Lockwood 2005), and others have cited Ethiopia and Rwanda as important case studies. Given the poor non-participatory development that is evident on the ground, Uganda can be included as a new example.

One of the first to write out the characteristics of what he dubbed "the Japanese model" and establish abstract characteristics that other societies may use as a guide was Chalmers Johnson (1982:314-5). Surprisingly, the country he said could want to learn from Japan's example was the United States (Johnson 1982:323). Johnson outlines a Japanese model, but he also emphasizes that the importance of Japan's experience lies in its building on pre-existing "assets" rather than blindly adhering to patterns that had previously succeeded elsewhere (1982:322).

He argues that; "... other nations seeking to emulate Japan's achievements might be better advised to fabricate the institutions of their own developmental states from local materials." (Johnson 1982:323)

⁶ Most of the African states have not had the same commitment needed for development as being reflected in lack of political will, poor governance and the non participation of the masses in making of the decisions that affect their economic and social development.

One of the first to write out the characteristics of what he dubbed "the Japanese model" and establish abstract characteristics that other societies may use as a guide was Chalmers Johnson (1982:314-5). Surprisingly, the country he said could want to learn from Japan's example was the United States (Johnson 1982:323). Johnson outlines a Japanese model, but he also emphasizes that the importance of Japan's experience lies in its building on pre-existing "assets" rather than blindly adhering to patterns that had previously succeeded elsewhere (1982:322)

“In the best of all possible worlds, African and Latin American countries would follow the lessons generated by the East Asian experience in the same way that East Asian policy-makers followed western models of capitalism: with such originality and inventiveness as to outperform the original.” (Evans 1998:83).

Adaptation and innovation should then be the hallmark of any emerging developmental state rather than a dogmatic following of the East Asian model⁷. This does not imply, however, that any developing country starting along a developmental route would not face unique difficulties that other nations had when they started down a similar path. For instance, one shouldn't ignore the altered global economic environment. Since the beginning of time, the core-periphery interactions have altered.

“It is highly unlikely that potential emulators of the Northeast Asian political economies will enjoy anything like the same favorable international conditions as did Japan, Korea and Taiwan” (Pempel 1999:180).

Global conditions are crucial for the rise of developmental states because, as Evans argues, "[industrial] revolution is inescapably characterized in global terms" and because, in many ways, the methods of developmental states are about changing the position of the state globally (Evans

⁷ The East Asian model is an economic system where the government invests in certain sectors of the economy in order to stimulate the growth of new (or specific) industries in the private sector. It generally refers to the model of development pursued in East Asian economies like Singapore, Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. In recent decades it has also been used to classify the contemporary economic system in mainland China

1995:6). The global environment therefore restricts and shapes the potential for states to experience fast growth and modernization (Beeson 2004:31). The establishment of developmental states, particularly in third world countries, is significantly impacted by the altered nature of these international relations.

Globalization and economic liberalization are two significant shifts [Economic liberalization is the process of reducing government controls and limits in an economy in return for increased private participation; the theory is linked to classical liberalism. Contrary to countries who attained such a status in the past, these place unique pressures on the industrial and economic strategies of the would-be developmental states today. It should be kept in mind that, while they were still present, these forces were less intense when the current successful developing nations began to implement these policies. Additionally, the US, which has since been a major force behind the demand to liberalize and open up national markets, in order to level the playing field, was forced by the East Asian governments' crucial strategic geopolitical position. They had good feelings for these states and even welcomed them into their markets. (Pempel 1999: 155; Chang 2006: 18). Of course, the political commitment these powers made to the Americans' side in the cold war negated this economic tolerance or support for them (Hayashi 2010:46).

As Beeson states,

“...the tolerant geopolitical environment which saw the US privilege systemic strategic issues over, narrower national economic interests, and which provided the relatively tolerant environment in which the DS [developmental] states flourished, has been overturned” (Beeson 2004:32).

New developing states do not have this privileged standing in regard to a dominant global power, and the urge to liberalize has been perceived as creating significant challenges for states trying to follow a developmental path (Hayashi 2010:60; Chang 2006; Wade 2003).

Instead of adopting neoliberal free market principles, many of the industrial strategies used by developing states have been protectionist and nationalistic.

The political climate in the world now puts a lot of pressure on nations to liberalize and open their markets. According to Robert Wade, this pressure restricts the options available to developing nations to safeguard their burgeoning sectors, many of which were used by the East Asian developmental republics (Wade 2003:622). The level of policy freedom that existed in the international trade system that existed before to the World Trade Organization, however, is exaggerated, according to Chang, who also claims that the new WTO "constraints are not as pervasive and binding as they are frequently made out to be" (Chang 2006: 51).

However, it is not only liberalization in terms of preventing protectionist industrial policies⁸ that impacts newly emerging developmental states, as a component of what is sometimes referred to as globalization, it is also the altered ties between local and global capital. With regard to domestic industrialists, who in the case of East Asia were dependent on the state in many ways for money, these new relationships put the state in a different position (Evans 1995:53; Hayashi 2010:62). Through this process of globalization, there has been a loss of state authority over their own national economy on a worldwide scale (Hayashi 2010:46). States trying to adopt the policies of former developmental states will face substantial challenges because controlling the market has been viewed as the essence of the developmental state (Wade, 1990).

Evans claims,

“The growing power of global capital and the growing integration of local capital into transnational networks has made close ties with capital riskier and more difficult for a developmental state” (Evans 2011:50)

Despite the fact that global capital's impact is undoubtedly growing, Sandbrook et al. contend that globalization also poses considerable obstacles for developing states (Sandbrook et al. 2007:227).

⁸ Protectionist Industrial policies is the economic policy of restraining trade between states (countries) through methods such as tariffs on imported goods, restrictive quotas, and a variety of other government regulations. Protectionist policies protect the producers, businesses, and workers of the import-competing sector in a country from foreign competitors. However, they hurt consumers in general, and the producers and workers in export sectors, both in the country implementing protectionist policies, and in the countries protected against.

These focus on global capital requirements, which don't always represent "a race to the bottom" but frequently show preferences for states where infrastructure and services are provided by the state, where the population is educated and in good health, and where the likelihood of violent disruption of the peace is low (Sandbrook et al. 2007:227-230).

The social democratic developmental nations that Sandbrook et al. research are considered as the exception rather than the rule, and the increasing risks associated with developing governments interacting with capital in a more globalized world still exist (Sandbrook et al. 2007).

That being said, these exceptions deserve investigation, and the reason given for their success is not the avoidance of global capital risks but rather their control through the provision of social safety (Sandbrook et al. 2007:230). Additionally to the difficulties brought on by globalization and liberalization, newly developing countries also have significantly slower worldwide market growth. At the time that Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Mauritius were successful in modernizing their economies, markets were increasing (Wade, 1990:346; Meisenhelder, 1997:290). Since then, this expansion has slowed significantly, making it more difficult for governments to attain growth using the same methods as the East Asian states, if not impossible (Wade 1990:347-8; Hayashi 2010:59).

The techniques of developmental nations should not necessarily be abandoned, however, as Wade argues, because there are better policies available (1990:348).

The decline in the expansion of the markets for goods is only one aspect of the change in the markets. The methods that will be required for developing states are also impacted by related changes in the global labor market. Even in China, which is frequently seen as the present center of manufacturing production, manufacturing jobs were declining at the end of the 20th century in both the global south and the global north (Evans 2011:41). The service industry, which is the fastest-growing segment of the labor market, needs a variety of inputs, but most importantly, according to Evans, they need human talents.

The options for many approaches to a developing state are as can be detailed below. This calls for a developmental state that differs significantly from its East Asian antecedents. Which type of government should Uganda choose if it wants to become a developmental state? (Democracy or authoritarianism?)

While it is widely regarded as admirable but technically challenging to transfer the economic growth and poverty reduction gains of developing states to other regions of the world, there are other elements to take into account, and governance is an integral part of this.. Democracy in itself has been seen as problematic for the emergence of developmental states due, to the short-termism that electoral politics can breed, as opposed to the long view that those pursuing a developmental vision in developmental states can take (Kelsall and Booth 2010:27). Discussions about the relationship between democracy and the specific state-society relationships built within developing regimes are sparked by this. The bureaucracy needs to be protected from societal expectations for autonomy, as we can see from Evans' concept of "embedded autonomy."

However, it is debatable whether authoritarian regimes are any less prone to instability and unpredictability than democratic ones, according to Sandbrook et al. (2007:23). This is frequently perceived as being at odds with the regular demands made by western donors for transparency and democracy, which are frequently referred to as good governance. Some scholars, however, consider the anti-democratic nature of many governments, such as Uganda, to be problematic in and of itself, or in relation to particular issues like environmental justice. (Neo, 2007)

The importance of the nature of the regime (authoritarian or democratic) for the emergence of developmental states has been one of the key debates within the developmental states literature. This is because democratization⁹ has been a key plank of western development policy and the

⁹ Democratization is the process whereby a country adopts such a regime. There is less agreement among political scientists about how that process occurs, including the criteria to use in determining if democratization has, in fact, taken place. Many countries have adopted democratic regimes only to see them collapse in a military coup or other revolt that yields an authoritarian government instead. Typically, we do not think that democracy has truly taken root until at least three national elections have been held. Another criterion raised by many experts is the peaceful transfer of power from one political party or coalition to the former opposition. Such a transition is critical because it indicates

developmental properties of authoritarianism is thus a significant challenge to this stance. As long ago as 1998 Gordon White highlighted that there was no longer a consensus on the positive developmental properties of democratization (White 1998:5).

The authoritarian developmental states of East Asia had a role in this change. This makes authoritarianism an alternative, but it also raises the question of whether Uganda actually needs such government. Authoritarianism and the establishment of developmental states have been linked positively by a number of theories. One perception of an authoritarian regime is its capacity for long-term thinking (Johnson 1987:143). Additionally, the state is able to disregard or deny the demands of interest groups, enabling the required bureaucratic autonomy (Wade 1990:375). However, as academics, we must remember that authoritarianism is not always viewed as being beneficial (White 1998:.7; Fritz and Menocal 2007:536) .

Vu, however, makes the case that the repression of the masses, as opposed to their inclusion, enables the creation of a developmental structure, which makes this evident (2007:30). However, not every authoritarian state creates this developmental pattern (Vu 2007:49). The relationship between growth and the type of regime, such as democracy or authoritarianism, often appears to be weak (Haggard 2004:59). However, this does not explain why authoritarian regimes in East Asia are grouped together as they emerge (Haggard 2004:60). The issue with this argument may be that, as Vu points out, authoritarianism (and democracy) are too general terms that cover a wide range of potential sets of state-society relations that require a little more investigation to gauge their impact on societal growth. (2007:48).

However, the majority of the research that addresses the establishment of new developing states has claimed that they are most likely to be democratic, particularly in Africa. White has claimed that one of the reason for this is that the majority of states are now democratic (White 1998). Though many claim that doing so would result in the "optimal" developmental outcomes, it is

that the major political forces in a country are prepared to settle their disputes without violence and to accept that they will all spend periods of time out of office.

also an aspiration (Edigheji, 2005; Musamba 2010). Of course, there are already developing democracies, notably in Japan and Botswana. However, democracy may alter the structure of progressive nations by necessitating a wider coalition, as in Botswana (Poteete, 2009), as opposed to a more focused one in South Korea (Vu, 2007). Evans contends that in the East Asian developmental state cases he examines, the thick linkages of embeddedness were developed with a relatively small group of bureaucrats and businessmen.

He examines case studies from India and Austria, nevertheless, and suggests

“...a broadly defined embeddedness may offer a more robust basis for transformation in the long run. This suggestive evidence argues for further exploration of potential variations of embedded autonomy” (Evans 1995, p.17).

Therefore, Evans believes that in freshly emerging developmental states, broader integration of social groups like labor and other civil society interests under a democracy may be both feasible and desirable. In a new paper, Evans makes the case that, in contrast to the developmental state of the 20th century, the 21st-century counterpart will need to forge strong bonds and integrate with a wide swath of society (Evans 2010; 2011). He views the developmental state of the twenty-first century as primarily a capability-enhancing state, seeking to advance the capabilities of its populace through supplying collective goods like health and education (Evans 2010; 2011) . It should be clearly noted that he does not see this as a complete departure from the developmental state model of the East Asian states and highlights the high levels of investment in education (Evans 2010:5; Evans 2011:47).

The 'knowledge' required by the Ugandan state, however, cannot be achieved solely by forging the intimate relationships Evans and others have recorded between business executives and the bureaucracy in the East Asian scenario due to the emphasis on the creation of capacities (Evans, 1995; Moon and Prasad 1994). The demand for "knowledge on common priorities at the community level" will be much greater (Evans 2011, p.49). In order to do this, policies "must be drawn from democratically organized public discourse," according to Evans (Evans 2011:43). This presents a problem to Uganda as a state with less public discourse.

The other question to ponder over is that of bureaucracy¹⁰ for Uganda if the developmental state perspective shall take on effectively. State capacity and the effectiveness of the state, in that it is able to act and attain significant progress towards most of its goals, continue to be an essential foundational element of developmental states (Evans 2010:3). A necessary condition for the creation of a developmental state in Uganda is the construction of an efficient government with a large bureaucracy (Leftwich 2008:4). The creation of a developmental state is thought to be critically dependent on the type of bureaucracy that researchers typically address. The bureaucracies of developmental nations are typically thought to come close to the Weberian ideal in a number of areas. Their staffing is considered to be substantial. In a developing country, the civil service is typically perceived as being recruited from prestigious colleges on the basis of merit, having reputation as a profession, having clear opportunities for advancement based on merit, and feeling internally cohesive (Johnson, 1982; Evans, 1995).

Evans warns against presuming that developing countries like Uganda must become developmental states in order for there to be a "super bureaucracy" filled with "incorruptible super-bureaucrats" (1998:79). While there does need to be more than "pockets of efficiency" (which in earlier work he identified as present in nations like Uganda, Evans 1995:61), one can contend that minimal norms of probity and competence" will suffice in general and that radical transformation of bureaucratic practice can be reserved for agencies important to economic policy and planning (Evans 1998:79-80). Future developing states may need a new type of bureaucracy since they may be expected to do tasks that are very different from those performed by East Asian developmental state bureaucrats.

Evans has lately proposed that the developmental state for the twenty-first century must be one that increases capability. In this notion of the developmental state, the bureaucracy plays a very

¹⁰ A bureaucracy is a way of administratively organizing large numbers of people who need to work together. Organizations in the public and private sector, including universities and governments, rely on bureaucracies to function. The term bureaucracy literally means "rule by desks or offices," a definition that highlights the often impersonal character of bureaucracies.

different role. In this paradigm, one of the major functions of the state is to encourage the co-production of capability-enhancing services by establishing connections with civil society actors that enable a research consensus on the provision of common goods like education and health (Evans 2011:49). This calls into question the cooperative or competitive nature of the state's connections with the civil society in a nation like Uganda. As opposed to East Asian bureaucrats who used industrial policy to advance their own agendas, the talents and dispositions needed for these types of operations are completely different.

A 21st century progressive state must have the capacity and effectiveness to succeed, even while the bureaucracy still demands a high level of skill. Due to the increased levels of direct participation and service involved in this paradigm, more competency is actually likely to be needed (Evans 2010:7). There is a general consensus among academics that, if developmental states do manifest in the near future, they will be very different from the states that were originally assigned that term. The value of designating states as developmental states in situations when they cannot be claimed to possess the characteristics initially linked to the category is still up for debate.

States seeking to fulfill certain developmental tasks could feel benefits from the connection. The value of designating states as developmental states in situations when they cannot be claimed to possess the characteristics initially linked to the category is still up for debate. By associating with states that are viewed as "successful," there may be perceived benefits for states trying to fulfill certain developmental tasks. On the other hand, it's possible that focusing our arguments on the parallels and contrasts between current social, political, and economic connections and the original developmental state model will actually hinder our ability to analyse these patterns.

In conclusion, Uganda has three main development tasks to complete in order to achieve economic transformation: planning the process, developing suitable policies, and putting the plans and policies into practice. For a number of reasons, the development process needs to be planned. The decisions cannot be made in the best way possible by the free market since the changes needed are significant and the majority of developing economies are characterized by

pervasive market failures. Instead of using restricted, incomplete models, comprehensive development frameworks must be used to reconcile the interdependence of all process components.

A review of the possibility for new roles and tasks for the State in the contemporary global setting has become more urgent as a result of the numerous financial crises. The LDCs should attempt to enhance their state capabilities in order to pursue good development governance, according to the main thrust of the argument. Africa is trapped in a developmental crisis, one that is deeper and more enduring than the typical, limited monetary or financial crises depicted in the mainstream literature. An economy's broad inability to produce the conditions required for a sustained increase in the standard of living is referred to as a developmental crisis. The always-mentioned issue is mostly structural in nature, with roots in the colonial era and post-colonial administrations' failure to substantially transform the economies they inherited at independence into developmental states.

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