

**Spilling Blood Over Water: The New Dynamics In Borderland
Conflicts In The Horn Of Africa**

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ABSTRACT

Although Kenya is considered to be peaceful unlike her neighbors, a closer scrutiny reveals an unprecedented wave of internal and cross-border conflicts. These conflicts - mainly manifesting as political, economic, environmental conflicts, conflicts over natural resources, land and tribal clashes and lately terrorism - are sending signals that all is not rosy as the outside world has been erroneously been made to believe. The resource-based conflicts prevalent in ASALs have completely distorted development programmes and eroded civil administration of this vast and rugged countryside. However, for many years, nomadic herdsman have roamed the harsh, semi-arid lowlands that stretch across 80 percent of Kenya and 60 percent of Ethiopia. These herdsman have long been accustomed to adapting to a changing environment but in recent years, they have faced challenges such as dwindling water supplies forcing the pastoralists migrate in search of suitable water and land. The search has brought tribal groups in Ethiopia and Kenya in increasing conflict. The result has been cross-border raids in which members of both groups kill each other, raid livestock, and torch huts over grass and water. The main aim of this paper therefore, is to provide an overview of current existing policies, institutions and other measures that impact on conflict management in Kenya. It also highlights the principles that act as the 'lens' through which the policy analysis is conducted to identify the policy interventions and lessons learnt that should be integrated into a holistic and cohesive peace building and conflict management policy.

Key words: Borderland, conflict, Africa

1.0 INTRODUCTION

At the end of cold war, most parts of the Africa continent continued to experience political changes of monumental proportion. Monumental, not only, because of the drastic restructuring of social and economic and political spaces, but also of the introduction of new forms of politics and political actors. In relation to these changes, the African continent was equally characterized by a succession of large-scale refugee movements, internal population displacements and mass repatriation movements. In a number of countries - Angola, Burundi, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Somalia, for example, large proportion of the population have been uprooted, forced to abandon their homes by communal and ethnic conflict, persecution and violence.

Most of these refugees have ended up into Kenya with a number of arms or religious fundamental ideologies. The process has witnessed a profound and influx of arms into Kenya

and further these arms have fueled intra-ethnic and inter-border conflicts and furthered terrorist aggression into the country particularly from the Republic of Somalia. Many of these conflicts in Africa are as a result of the unsatisfactory nature of inter-state borders. Most if not all these borders were inherited from colonial times, and were the product of negotiations and treaties between the colonial powers, decided in Europe with the aid of poor maps and with scant attention to African peoples. At independence, the African governments shied away from making adjustments, and in any case, this was difficult as they did not all reach independence at the same time. Currently, the existing state structures do not satisfy variously the aspirations for cultural identity, autonomy, economic democracy and self-determination of different nationalities co-existing with the contemporary states. Thus, the ease with which dissidents of a state are harbored in neighboring countries and guerrillas armed and trained there, is itself a cause of both internal and inter-state conflicts.

Viewed in contrast to many of its neighbors, Kenya is often seen as a bastion of stability. The country has several strengths that militate against the outbreak of mass violence, but it also exhibits many of the factors that have been markers of civil strife elsewhere in Africa: This includes strong ethnic divisions, polarized political issues, political manipulation, rampant violence, socio-economic disparities and a lack of economic opportunity, and endemic corruption. When combined with the increased availability of firearms, this dangerous mix becomes all the more volatile. The easy availability of such weapons within the country contributes to the growing culture of violence that is taking root inside Kenya. In addition to rising crime and generalized insecurity in recent years, the country has experienced repeated flashes of politically inspired ethnic violence, especially during election periods. Those instigating this deadly violence have not been held to account. This continuing pattern of violence and impunity, together with the spread of small arms, threatens Kenyan society and greatly endangers human rights. As Chacha argues:

Scholars define a territorial or border dispute as disagreement over the possession/control of land between two or more territorial entities or over the possession or control of land by a new state. These disputes are often related to the possession of natural resources such as rivers, fertile farmland, mineral or oil resources although the disputes can also be driven by culture, religion and ethnic nationalism. Conflicts in Kenya are many and complex but the most common is cross border conflict. The conflict in most cases manifest as livestock raiding or rustling, violent disputes over scarce watering points, land clashes between pastoralists and agriculturalists, clan-based violence, conflicts over pasture and highway banditry. The root causes of these conflicts are principally competition for shrinking pasture and water resources. They revolve around livestock and involve the use of arms, which make the conflicts more violent that result in indiscriminate killing.

From a state perspective, boundaries are essential, since they describe the territory that, according to Max Weber, is created because multiple powers contest a finite global space – each power seeking monopoly, exclusive control or sovereignty. While borders demarcate a state's territory borders also describe identities, belonging, and political affiliation.

For thousands of years, nomadic herdsmen have roamed the harsh, semi-arid lowlands that stretch across 80 percent of Kenya and 60 percent of Ethiopia. These herdsmen have long been accustomed to adapting to a changing environment. But in recent years, they have faced challenges unlike any in living memory: As temperatures in the region have risen and water supplies have dwindled, the pastoralists have had to range more widely in search of suitable water and land. That search has brought tribal groups in Ethiopia and Kenya in increasing conflict, as pastoral communities kill each other over water and grass. The pastoralists such as the Turkana of Kenya and the Dassanech, Nyangatom, and Mursi of Ethiopia — who are among the more than two dozen tribes whose lives and culture depend on the waters of the Omo River and the body of water into which it flows, Lake Turkana.¹

In particular, Lake Turkana has steadily shrunk in the past 40 years because of increased evaporation from higher temperatures and a steady reduction in the flow of the Omo due to less rainfall, increased diversion of water for irrigation, and upstream dam projects. As the lake has diminished, it has disappeared altogether from Ethiopian territory and retreated south into Kenya. This has made the Dassanech people to follow the water, and in doing so have come into direct conflict with the Turkana of Kenya. The result has been cross-border raids in which members of both groups kill each other, raid livestock, and torch houses. The cross border conflicts in Kenya and its neighbors such as Ethiopia therefore need lasting solutions that include creation of an institution for peace where an obligated person in government has to be answerable on issues pertaining to conflict and peace, mainstream of issues of peace and development, ensure equitable development and enhance the role of traditional institutions and involvement of the youth in peace processes.

2.0 Methodology

This study sought to identify and analyze key conflict actors in the cross border of Kenya and her neighbors; Examine the causes and dynamics of cross border conflict and Propose interventions to address the problem. The main justification of this study is due to the fact that: Deaths as a result of cross border conflict are now alarming. People have lost loved ones while others displaced. In the process, governments loose young energetic people who participate in development of a nation. It is therefore paramount that lasting solutions to cross border conflict be found if the Kenya Ethiopia governments have to develop and improve the lives and living standards of the pastoralists that border each other. The study therefore seeks to establish mechanisms of finding lasting solutions through collaboration from governments and non-governmental organizations among other stakeholders. The methodologies to be employed in this study include multiple tools designed to triangulate with one another for maximum data reliability. In particular, key informant interviews will be conducted among the tribes of Kenya

¹ See for example, P. Little, *Somalia: Economy without State* (Oxford and Bloomington, IN: James Currey and Indiana University Press, 2003); P. Little, 'Conflictive Trade, Contested Identity: The Effects of Export Markets on Pastoralists of Southern Somalia', *African Studies Review* 39 (1), 1996: 25–53; H. Mahmoud, 'Risky Trade, Resilient Traders: Trust and Livestock Marketing in Northern Kenya', *Africa* 78 (4), 2008: 561–81; H. Mahmoud, 'Innovations in Pastoral Livestock Marketing: The Emergence and the Role of "Somali Cattle Traders-cum-ranchers" in Kenya', in J. G. McPeak and P. D. Little (eds), *Livestock Marketing in Eastern Africa: Research and Policy Challenges* (Rugby, Warwickshire: Intermediate Technology Publications Limited, 2006), pp. 129–44.

Ethiopia border. The interview questions mostly open-ended will seek to allow respondents to give anecdotal evidence to support their opinions. The researcher will conduct with a variety of stakeholders including government and military officials, CBO representatives, chiefs, and elders.

Literature review has been used as one of the methods of data collection. The main purpose is to summarize or comment on what is already known about cross border conflicts. Sampled respondents from communities known as opinion leaders, provincial administration mainly chiefs and Assistant chiefs and officials from non-governmental organizations operating in the areas are to be interviewed in a group of 10-12 each using a check list. The purpose of employing this method is to engage participants in a debate in order to provoke their thinking.

Key ethnic communities in the Kenya and its neighboring that can be interviewed include the Oromo of Ethiopia and the Boran tribes of Kenya. The other tribes of interest are Turkana who live in northwestern Kenya, making up 2.5 percent of the national population, or close to a million people, according to the 2009 Kenyan census. The Daasanach who reside in southern Ethiopia and make up less than 1 percent of the national population, or around 50,000. More recently, the Daasanach have lost significant portions of their lands and animals in part due to climate change

2.1 Literature Review

The concept of borders is a mechanism that was employed by Europeans to mark a distinct division between those who could have access to the rights and benefits of the state and those who could not. Therefore cross border conflict in the history of mankind is not new. The cross-border areas with Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Southern Sudan and Uganda have been characterized by conflict since time immemorial. Conflict in these cross-border localities is associated with cattle rustling, whose key drivers are water and pastoral land.

Conflict in Kenya is not new. The cross-border areas with Somalia, Ethiopia, Southern Sudan and Uganda have been characterized by conflict since time immemorial. Conflict in these cross-border localities is associated with cattle rustling, whose key drivers are water and pastoral land. A culture of cattle as the only form of wealth informs these conflicts, which usually occur between two or three communities across each border area. It has, however, also attained new dimensions due to political issues and the radicalization of certain sections of the Islamic communities. Internally, there are some key localities where conflict has regularly occurred – albeit on a low scale and concerning community identities – since the first election of parliamentary delegates in 1962.

Aspects of conflict have of late revolved around the question of community identities in relation to administrative and political constituency borders, whilst another type of conflict has been witnessed among non-pastoral communities concerning land. This is frequently at low levels – as has been the case along the Samburu-Isiolo, the Narok-Kisii border, the Kericho-Kisumu border, the Kericho-Kisii border, the Kajiado-Limuru border (*Maai Mahiu*), the Tana River and the Mount Elgon area. In these cases, conflict is around access to land for livelihoods and community identity, as defined by the land a community occupies.

From the outset, it is important to point out that the struggle for independence in Kenya was focused on the re-possession of land. Conflict in Kenya is therefore informed by a history where the original communities to these lands were forcefully removed to give way to large scale farming for white farmers. After independence, restitution was never pursued; hence communities continue to clamour for ancestral land as part of their identity and political rights.

2.2 Evolving rationales for cattle raiding

Cattle raiding has been defined as a group invasion or forceful attack by an outside pastoralist group with an aim of stealing cattle rather than seeking territorial expansion. Increasing violent and destructive instances of raiding among East African herders have been recorded in the past two decades (Mkutu 2001) and are often, but wrongly so, associated with resource scarcity in the region's semi-arid lowlands (Bogale & Korf 2007).

Classical anthropological works on the subject as pointed out by Fleisher (2002) point to the ritual importance of acquiring enemy livestock as a proof of masculine warrior hood (Bollig 1990), and the human-ecological herd management and redistribution functions of cattle raids (Sweet 1965). Accumulation of wealth through cattle raiding where the researchers made a distinction between the practice of replenishing one's herds sanctioned by tradition and the raiding and racketeering for self-enrichment started since the 1980s. In the absence of state protection, inevitably, pastoralist communities opt for self-protection. This has been a natural choice for these communities for decades now. While the desire to have arms to protect oneself may seem to be legitimate to the outsider, using them in cattle raiding certainly does not. In this respect a situation emerges where the distinction between the 'legitimate' use of guns in self-defense and their illegitimate use in raids blurs.

Recent studies in the horn of Africa's pastoral peripheries show that cattle raids have been intertwined with strongly militarized conflicts such as civil wars and cross-border disputes. These often involved rebel movements with a nomadic background (Fukui & Markakis 1994). Cattle raiders are driven by symbolic, pecuniary, and economic motives. Raids occur in retaliation to prior attacks in order to (re-)acquire stolen stock and to replenish decimated herds or they are simply deployed to intimidate enemy groups.

Historically, cattle raids were carried out by groups of young male warriors who form closely knit raiding parties (Almagor 1979). In the same breath I agree with scholars who have rejected the idea that present-day cattle raiding continues to serve the purpose of maintaining group solidarity or accumulating prestige (Blench 1996). A reference case study is that of the Kuria pastoralist people who inhabit the Tanzanian-Kenyan border. Fleisher (1999:238) describes their evolving livestock raiding practices as follows:

Kuria cattle raiding is by no means a new phenomenon, but it has undergone a profound transformation in the course of this century – from its pre-colonial roles of demonstrating the mettle of new warriors and enlarging the community cattle herd to an illicit, often-times quite violent, cash-market oriented enterprise'.

Similar interpretations are provided for the following ethnic communities; the Pokot and Turkana (Hendrickson *et al.* 1996, 1998), the Datoga (Ndagala 1991) or the Karamoja (Ocan 1994) pastoralists of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda respectively. Hendrickson *et al.* (1996) while trying to differentiate redistributive and predatory livestock raiding argues that redistributive raiding occurs among groups predominantly involved in subsistence animal husbandry and does not pose a threat to their livelihoods. As Oba (1992) demonstrates in his account of Turkana land use conflicts, raiding livestock of one's traditional enemies is a means to expand rangelands, restock herds and improve social status. Raiding campaigns by the young warriors are therefore

sanctioned by elders and have evolved ‘according to strict rules governing preparation, engagement, disengagement and conflict resolution’ (Hendrickson *et al.* 1996:21).

More recently, cattle raids along borders have become more predatory in form in most cases implicating external actors such as businessmen, warlords, security personnel or government officials. That is why Ocan (1994: 128-129) concludes that cattle raiding in the volatile Sudanese-Ugandan-Kenyan Karamojong cluster mutated from herd restocking and accumulation to ‘selling livestock for money or for more weapons’. The sophisticated weapons and military tactics employed by raiders, widespread looting and indiscriminate killings during cattle rustling in Northwest Kenya justifies Osamba’s (2000:8) identification of cattle warlordism’ as the new phenomenon of the 1980s.

It is arguable that cattle raids have been transformed from an adaptive into a maladaptive and violent strategy, thereby increasing male adult mortality, famines and epidemics among pastoralist groups like the Karamojong (Gray *et al.* 2003). On the other hand, the social and economic costs of conflict have increased considerably, making some scholars to conclude that ‘large-scale raids seem to be a major cause of chronic poverty among pastoralists’ (Krätli & Swift 2001:13). As much as it is debatable whether use of weapons can act as a ‘change agent’ there is reason to believe (Knighton 2006), that the availability of small and light arms in the pastoralist lowlands is partly to blame for this trend (Mkutu 2007).

Among the Ethiopian pastoral communities, the rapid escalation of pastoralist conflicts since 1991 is interwoven with attempts to control territory more permanently and to claim political representation on ethnic grounds (Hagmann & Mulugeta 2008). However, violent confrontations involving the Toposa of Southern Sudan and Turkana of Northern Kenya are reported weekly. For instance, in 2004, just a few kilometers from Narus, Sudan, a group of over one hundred Turkana warriors from Kenya crossed the border to attack a Toposa kraal on the outskirts of Narus. In the clash, over thirty people were reported killed, and more than one hundred cattle, worth over US\$22,000, stolen. While the between 2004 and 2008, local peace deals reduced the frequency and intensity of tribal raids, in May 2008, however, Taposa raiders crossed into the Lokichoggio Division of northern Kenya and killed over forty-three deaths, the majority being Taposa (McEvoy and Murray 2008).

Of concern to scholars is that the attacks are normally well-coordinated and involve heavy and general-purpose machine guns, RPGs, 60mm mortars, and AKM assault rifles. In addition to the killings, the attackers make away with animals worth millions of dollars. The question the is who funds the attacks and for what benefit.

2.3 FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE CONFLICT

It is important to brain storm possible reasons behind border. First, unfavorable climatic conditions often force pastoralists to migrate in search of grass and water. It is during the dry season that young pastoralists leave their villages with livestock in search of water and grazing lands. It is possible that in such situations that pastoralist engages in conflict over herding territory and even seeks to replenish the lost cattle. When conditions are made worse by extended periods of drought, conflicts become more intensified and frequent. The Turkana for example have been faced with a persistent drought problem since 1999. They call this event “Kichutanak,” which means “it has swept away everything, even animals.” It is not surprisingly

then, that prolonged drought and the cattle deaths associated with it brought escalating levels of violence in the region.

In March 2006, over 600 Turkana families from Oropoi village, Kenya, left their homes and crossed the border into Uganda with their livestock in search of water. This became their only option when the sole water pump within a radius of 50 km dried up (*Africa News*, March 28, 2006). Inevitably, the neighboring Dodoth tribe in northern Uganda attacked the fleeing Turkana.

2.3.1 COLONIAL AND POST-COLONIAL POLICIES

Traditionally, cattle rustling that involved some violence was redistributive and only involved stealing cattle in order to replenish herds after death from drought or to pay out as bride price. Whenever a member of a tribe was killed, cattle were offered as compensation and the culprits were subjected to intense cleansing rituals. Prior to the system of hierarchical government, the councils of elders, traditional courts, and peer groups who were at the center of authority, governed raids to ensure that they did not spiral out of control and when disputes arose, traditional mechanisms were employed to settle them (Mkutu 2003).

However, the emergence of the colonial rulers disrupted the pastoralist social order, replacing it with a system of provincial government appointees within newly established borders that limited the free movement of pastoralists. Traditionally, land belonging to families was passed down from one generation to the next, but alienation of pastoralists from their land, combined with discriminatory land reforms eroded this custom (Kandagor 2005). According to Mkutu:

...., pastoral communities were isolated from other areas that enjoyed the benefits of colonial security and development (Mburu 1999). The apparent crackdown on cattle raiding is emblematic of an overall attack on pastoralism itself, on the grounds that it was a primitive and thus inhumane way of life. The weakening of traditional governance has undermined pastoralists' authority and ability to settle disputes. Without adequate alternatives to replace traditional structures of governance and security, pastoralists operate in an anarchic environment (Mkutu 2003).

Today with the colonial attitude having persisted in the post-colonial era, the question of land privatization and government policies that favor large-scale agricultural groups over nomadic livelihoods has made competition over grazing areas to grow increasingly fierce. Furthermore, other scholars such as Duffield argue that neo-liberal policies that embrace a market economy polarize rich and poor, resulting in a new generation of youth that disregard the authority of elders by obtaining wealth through militia formation and banditry (1997). The local business and political elites use cattle rustling as a means for commercial profit, capitalizing on the breakdown of traditional lines of authority.

2.3.2 COMMERCIALIZATION OF CATTLE RAIDING

As Mkutu writes, commercialization in cattle rustling has led to major changes in economic, social and political structures in the border lands/areas (2003). The local businessmen and in particular politicians are strongly suspected to fund raids in order to sell cattle on the black market to places as far away as South Africa and Saudi Arabia (Mkutu 2003). For instance in Kenya, majority of politicians from pastoralists are reportedly exporters of meat

While small-scale raiding may not clear the entire stock, commercialized raids with proper and elaborate planning can render entire communities destitute. Buchanan-Smith and

Lind (2005) suggest that the large infrequent raids, coupled with repeated small-scale incidents in southern Turkana create an environment of insecurity and financial hardship.

The commercialization of cattle raiding has had devastating effects on the pastoralist economy. In many instances, warriors conducting large commercial raids outnumber security forces. In Baragoi region of Kenya over forty two (42) security officers were killed by cattle rustlers in the month November 2012. The security officers were ambushed by the rustlers on their way to Baragoi to recover the stolen animals. I agree with Mkutu's assertion that there is evidence that many local security providers are in collusion with the profiteers of raids (2003). The lack of state control in the pastoralist region has made way for what Osamba calls "the emergence of cattle warlords with armed militia" (2000). Without proper security provision, a small number of entrepreneurs will continue to benefit at the expense of a great number of people.

2.3.3 LACK OF STATE SECURITY PROVISION

As part of a political campaign that favors agricultural communities over pastoralist, most governments in the Sub-Saharan Africa have not invested a great deal in infrastructure and public services in the pastoralist border areas. This scenario aggravates the lack of state security in such regions. There is no doubt that insufficient roads, schools, proper health care, inaccessible lines of communication, and lack of qualified security personnel, pastoralists are left with no choice but to arm themselves in order to protect their families and livestock. Further, cross-border raiders cannot be prosecuted easily because governments lack the infrastructure required to prosecute those involved in cattle raids. The Small Arms Survey reports that nearly 60 percent of residents living along the Kenya-Sudan border are dissatisfied with security provisions in their communities (McEvoy and Murray 2008).

In Kenya and Uganda where the military's role is normally restricted to responding to large-scale incidents and carrying out community disarmament programs, governments have armed local defense units to provide security at the local level. These are identified civilians who are given a registered firearm and ammunition with limited training. In Kenya, for instance, the Kenyan Police Reservists (KPR), armed with Kalashnikov-pattern and G3 assault rifles, function as a community task force mandated to respond to local crime and disputes. According to Bevan:

While the KPR are sometimes effective in defending communities against cattle raids, they are known to lend out their weapons to warriors for raiding purposes, thus undermining the very security they are supposed to protect. Moreover, a 2008 ammunition study in Kenya found that the majority of illicit civilian-held ammunition was Kenyan-manufactured; revealing that it had either been stolen from weakly guarded stockpiles or sold by corrupt officials (Bevan 2008a).

2.3.4 PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS

Pastoralists who live along borders are suspected to provide a large market for small arms. In the past, pastoralists practiced cattle rustling using bows and arrows. Today, the availability of cheap and easy-to-use high-powered assault rifles, namely the AK-47 has led the conflict to uncontrollable levels with increased fatalities and indiscriminate killing during raids. Whereas it is not easy to estimate the exact numbers of small arms that are in circulation in the region, experts estimate that it is well over 300,000 (Regional Program of Action for Peace and Security 2006). The pastoralist communities argue that they arm themselves to either protect their families

and livestock from warriors of other tribes and bandits or to raid livestock from other communities. They also use guns as an investment that can be traded for livestock and other commercial goods.

3.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This study is based on conflict and contact theories. Conflict theory emphasizes the role of coercion and power in producing social order. This perspective is derived from the works of Karl Marx, who saw society as fragmented into groups that compete for social and economic resources. According to the theory, inequality exists because those in control of a disproportionate share of society's resources actively defend their advantages. Groups and individuals advance their own interests, struggling over control of societal resources.

Contact theory proponents usually think of intergroup contact as having an effect on prejudiced attitudes and discriminatory behavior because of its effects on stereotyping. They think that hostile stereotypes are born of social isolation and broken by personal acquaintance (e.g., Allport, 1954, chap. 16). They recognize that the cognitive and emotional mechanisms involved in the development and modification of intergroup attitudes are very complex and can be affected by many variables. It is therefore possible to explain and predict different relations between contact and conflict (prejudice, discrimination, stereotyping, hostility, etc.) by taking these conditioning variables into account. It should be possible to specify the kinds and situations of contact that will have desirable effects and those that will have negative effects. When contact is the right kind of contact, in a favorable setting, it should tend to reduce prejudice and discrimination.

4.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

This section tries to propose interventions that can address the cross border conflict. First there is need for governments to install adequate qualified security personnel pastoralist regions. In particular, the governments should strive to offer sizeable incentives so that security forces do not resort to corruption as a way of supplementing their income. Security posts should be positioned on borders and at violence hotspots where tribes are known to clash.

Secondly, governments and international organizations should support and build the capacity of local community based organizations that work in the pastoralist regions to mitigate conflict and sensitize communities with workshops and peace building campaigns. This includes supplying vehicles and community based radios so that community based organizations can effectively contact authorities for early response.

There is need to improve infrastructure especially build feeder roads connecting main roads to small villages so that authorities can quickly reach affected areas. Provision of access roads to villages would act as a deterrent to raiding warriors. Equally, improved road transport would also enable pastoralists to partake in local commerce.

Having identified water as a source of conflict, governments and donors need to build more water wells so that villages can sustain their livestock during the dry season. This is likely

to make the young warriors be confined to their areas as opposed to migration in search of water in other areas outside their jurisdiction

There is also need to establish cooperatives and inter-tribal commerce of local goods and livestock in order to build partnerships and economic development through trade. This would, in the long-term, undermine the illicit commercial practices of livestock traders in the area.

Once proper security provisions have been established, traditional disarmament practices should be reformed. Coordinated voluntary disarmament programs should be implemented that disarm neighboring tribes simultaneously. For those surrendering weapons, some kind of compensation should be offered. In order to avoid solely rewarding those with weapons, “weapons for development” programs should be implemented where villages are rewarded with improved infrastructure and social services after a certain number of weapons have been collected. Before and during the disarmament exercises, community members should play an active role in the process in order to give them ownership over the security of their communities. Particular attention should be given to the reintegration phase that trains ex-combatants for employment, so that they do not return to a life of violence.

All the countries in the Horn of Africa should promote the positive aspects of regional integration (common market, trade, seasonal migration) in order to overcome (or pragmatically sideline) political stalemates (Badme-Abyei-Illempi triangle).

Agree on local border administration in order to ensure that local knowledge as well as borderland population interests are reflected in border practice. In the absence of services, often borderland populations become agents in illicit trade. In order to fight criminal activities and collect taxes, it is imperative that states include borderland populations in their welfare and service delivery mechanisms and make them part of the »legal« trade structures.

Strengthen cross-border security and mutual co-operation by localizing border management and calling for vigilance by the border population. Enhance efficiency and inclusiveness in peace-building along the borders. Promote the sense of belonging for all citizens; encourage women in border-conflict management

5.0 Conclusion and discussions

The factors contributing to the pastoralist conflict are multidimensional, and have ramifications that affect livelihoods within and across borders. There is need for governments to invest sufficient human and financial capital in addressing conflict and the underlying underdevelopment in the pastoral regions. Given the poor disarmament record of governments and the fact that they lack the capacity to conduct simultaneous cross-border disarmament programs, disarmament does not appear to be a palatable option until there is a full overhaul of the security sector supported by policies to address the demand for small arms.

The efforts of local conflict mitigation organizations have proved to be an effective alternative to the recent destabilizing disarmament initiatives. As a result, a culture of

pastoralism is emerging that relies more heavily on local instruments of conflict response, and their respective consequences, as opposed to confidence-eroding disarmament programs that prematurely disarm insecure communities. When communities no longer face threats from neighboring tribes and inadequate security providers, it is possible that weapons can lose their utility and worth and voluntary disarmament will be an appropriate answer to the small arms dilemma in this pastoralist region. Of paramount importance is coherent and well coordinated cross border peace initiatives and linkages which have the potential to reduce cross border conflicts. The study proposes that strengthening cross border linkages and relations may be the first step towards securing the borders.

- The relatively high bride-wealth (usually cows) that young men need to pay often at once, combined with the continued need for bride wealth for polygamous elders
- The unbalanced reliance of the state on home guards (community based security force) of particular

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