ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY IN UGANDA

JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

SECURITY PARADOX: INTERPRETING INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP FROM INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

Through the lenses of international security perspective, this article examines States' dilemma in their efforts to protect their territorial integrity and independence. Due to the difficulty of ascertaining States' intention in acquiring weapons, increasing military forces or defence budgets, States create a situation of insecurity and fear among themselves. The article contextualises the situation by examining the India-Pakistan relationship.

Introduction

Security dilemma is at the heart of international politics. In the defence of their territorial integrity States by their actions consciously or unconsciously create a situation of quintessential dilemma. Anarchy as the basis of international arrangement as regards States existence and relationship, brings with it a number of confusions one of which is security paradox. The absence of overarching entity with the power to regulate States' conduct has enabled the perpetuation of intense competition in the area of peace and security. In an attempt to ensure continued existence, relevance and autonomy, States intensely compete in the manufacturing, production, stockpiling and development of and acquisition of dangerous weapons. States continue to live under fear and dilemma and hence continue to take actions to be able to suppress those fears in the event they appear. Not only the recent past has witnessed massive increase in defence budget on technology and weapons acquisition, States have equally continued to increase the number of military personnel placing them in strategic locations effectively to be able to respond to perceived threats. These are done by States because of the difficulty or near impossibility of ascertaining the real intention of other perceived hostile States who are equally running the race thereby effectively bringing a state of security paradox.

It is not in doubt, that the United Nations Charter contains provisions for individual or collective self-defence which necessarily entitles a State to put preparatory measures for such defence, however, there exist concerns as to the extent to which States can go towards preparation for self-defence as evidence by the recent events for example from Iran and North Korea. The United Nations Security Council has in many instances proved powerless to prevent continued proliferation of dangerous weapons.

It is true that some measures have been and are being taken by the security Council including imposition of sanctions against States perceived to be a threat to peace, these measures in some cases are even counter-productive to peace as States have demonstrated their capacity to inwardly

develop dangerous weapons outside the monitoring of international community. The existence of security paradox is perhaps more evidence in the relationship of India and Pakistan.

International Law Regulation of States Relations

International law rules exist but anarchy operates in the relations between States. No doubt the United Nations Charter, other relevant international legal instruments and jurisprudence of international tribunals have provided or indicated how States are to relate, the absence of enforcing authorities similar to those existing at the domestic level to some extents undermines the efficacy of the law.

India-Pakistan Relations

On the 15 of August 1947, British India was partitioned to what is now known as India and Pakistan.[1]The partitioning formally makes the two States part of the international anarchical society subject to no overarching authority. Since then their relationship has been characterised by hot and cold wars. To date, they have fought three major armed conflicts;1948, 1965 and 1971[2] in addition to many other armed clashes.

Typical with anarchic system, coupled with the enduring rivalry, security dilemma continues to exist in their relationship. Notwithstanding this rivalry and series of armed conflicts between the two, India and Pakistan have at various times unilaterally, jointly or with the help of a mediator taken steps aimed at easing their tension. These efforts brought about for example the Shimla Summit, Agra Summit and Lahore Summit.

At the same time, instances abound where the unilateral action of one or actions linked to one state such as the insurgency in Kashmir and Samjhauta Express bombings was considered threatening by the other thereby eroding any possible achievement made. The whole problem could be reduced to different understanding of the situation and different security interests which continue to create situation of uncertainty in their relationship. The security problem became tensed with their acquisition of nuclear weapons making the possibility of nuclear war in South Asia in the offing. What continues to be a source of tension is the Kashmir question. The enduring rivalry which continues to render the next action of one state unpredictable, coupled with huge military build-up and acquisition of sophisticated weapons exacerbates the fear in the mind of policy and decision makers of the States. The resulting situation is what has been discussed as

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[1]Peter Lyon, *Conflict between India and Pakistan: An Encyclopedia* (California: ABC-CLIO Inc, 2008).
[2]Ibid.

"anarchy".[3]This segment of the paper discusses the importance of anarchy as the root-cause of Indo-Pakistan conflict.

Anarchy as the Root-Cause

In an anarchical society, because no overarching authority beyond that of state exists and each state has to cater for its own security, States can find themselves engulfed in rivalry and conflicts largely because in their relationship the true intention of the mind of other States is uncertain.[4]. This may become more problematic in situations where States have history of enmity or conflicts between them.

The Indo-Pakistan conflict has a long history and to understand it one needs to understand their security concern, how they perceived each other and why several negotiations between them keep failing. Pakistan considers India as an aggressive neighbour with a permanent and long-term design ambition of becoming hegemonic and it has used and continues to use force against her neighbours as her instrument of foreign policy.[5]Pakistan believed that at independence, India wanted to have control over Afghanistan by its despatched of troops into the Pakistani northern areas to occupy Jammu and Kashmir in order to have land access to Afghanistan.[6]This was considered threatening and detrimental to the security interest of Pakistan because this would have outflanked its province of Punjab and cut-off its land link with China.[7]Jammu and Kashmir are "of considerable strategic importance and vital" for Pakistan's survival, the occupation of the area by India therefore "poses a grave military threat to Pakistan".[8]Pakistan further believed that since it is an obstacle to India's grand design, India has plans of neutralising or reducing her in size and importance.[9]Hence every action by India is with suspicion by Pakistan.

On the part of India, the partitioning of 1947 was not done properly and it continues to be hurt. It has been described as "one huge unmitigated disaster, the most unfortunate event in the history of the sub-continent"[10] because "(t)he feeling of being one undivided people was very much a reality among Hindus and Muslims till almost the end of the 19th century.[11]India

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[3]Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
[4]Ibid.
[5]Sardar S. F. Lodi, 'Security Concerns of Pakistan', *Defence Journal,* (December, 1998).
[6]Ibid.
[7]Ibid.
[8]Ibid.
[9]Ibid.
[10]Sanjeev Sabhlok, 'The Continuing Paradox of India-Pakistan Relations', <http://sabhlokcity.com/2010/12/the-continuing-paradox-of-india-pakistan-relations/>, accessed 27 November 2016.
[11]Government of India, *The Paradox of India Pakistan Relations* (Delhi: Government of India, 1965). P. 3

perceived Pakistan to be opposed to its nationhood and hostile to its civilisation.[12]This was exacerbated by the invasion of Kashmir by tribesmen aided and abetted by Pakistan's army. Kashmir was acceded to India by its ruler shortly after the invasion and deemed herself responsible for defending it and Pakistan was treated as an aggressor.[13] Since then, security dilemma between the two States continues to exist.

> Security dilemma is:
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> a two-level strategic predicament in relations between states and other actors … The first and basic level consist of a dilemma of interpretation about the motives, intentions and capabilities of others; the second derivative level consist of a dilemma of response about the most rational way of responding.[14]

Dilemma of interpretation is a predicament facing decision makers on security issues of having to decide whether perceived military policies and political postures of the other are for defence or offensive purposes.[15] This dilemma occurs due to the "perceived need by a state to make a decision in the existential condition of unresolvable uncertainty about the motives, intentions and capabilities of others".[16] In this situation, the decision makers would have to resolve whether such military developments are for defensive or offensive purposes.[17]

Indo-Pakistan relationship has been that of uncertainty occasioned by their perception of each other and their inability to get into the mind of the other and to resolve the actual or true motives or intention of each other's military developments. The history of enmity between them makes it more uncertain and since both have to resolve this dilemma of interpretation it appears that such resolution has often been fatalistic. This continues to create a spiral mutual hostility leading to what has been called security paradox.[18] Indeed "mistrust and uncertainty develops between groups because they all act in a similar fashion".[19]

Situations of uncertainty thrive under a state of anarchy. Anarchy, which technically means "the absence of a political authority in international politics above that of the sovereign state"[20] makes it impossible for decision makers of one state to fully get into the minds of the other state and to understand their intention.[21] Majority of security dilemma theorists

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[12]Ibid.
[13]Ibid.
[14]Booth and Wheeler, *Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*. P. 4
[15]Ibid.
[16]Ibid.
[17]Ibid.
[18]Ibid.
[19]Ibid. p. 22
[20]Ibid. p. 2
[21]John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2001). P. 31

considered that "permanent insecurity between nations and States is the inescapable lot of living in a condition of anarchy".[22] Similarly, "wherever …. anarchic society has existed … there has arisen what may be called the "security dilemma of men, or groups, or their leaders."[23] In anarchical society, each States judges "its grievances and ambitions according to the dictates of its own reason or desire".[24] Anarchy is therefore the root-cause of conflicts or at least provides a good ground for its existence.[25]

The impossibility to define intention of the other creates an existential condition of "unresolvable uncertainty"[26] which necessitates the need to strive for protection.[27] Mearsheimer has argued that "in a state of uncertainty, the rational approach for States was to assume that those who can do harm, might do harm, and to prepare for this possibility by creating countervailing offensive military potential".[28] This uncertainty combined with the ambiguous symbolism of weapons (with their capacity to deter, coerce and material capability to harm) creates the feeling of insecurity, mistrust and basic emotion of fear. Where intense fear exists even communities which hitherto were living peacefully could turn violent against each other.[29] This explains Indo-Pakistan hostile relationship; the enmity, mistrust, history of the past and the fact that each has to cater for its own security makes conflicts between them recurrent.

In striving to provide for their security India and Pakistan were trapped in an unending arms race dating back to the cold war in the 1960s.[30] Although each state is presently in possession of nuclear weapons they continue to amass other destructive weapons; India with the aim of becoming a regional power and Pakistan with the aim of maintaining "a rough parity for survival in the event of another conflict".[31] If a nuclear armed conflict were to exist between them it will certainly be "self-destructive and would not produce any winners or losers"[32]

In this state, there is therefore the pervasiveness of fear in the minds of their leaders about what the other will do next. There is the "fear of attack,

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[22]Booth and Wheeler, *Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*. P. 2
[23]John H. Herz, 'Idealist Internationalism and Security Dilemma', *World Politics,* 2/2 (1950). P. 57
[24]Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959). P. 159
[25]Robert Jervis, 'The Spiral of International Insecurity', in Richard Little and Michael Smith (eds.), *Perspectives on World Politics* (3rd edn.; Abingdon: Routledge, 2006). P. 54
[26]Booth and Wheeler, *Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*. P. 4
[27]Ibid. p. 22
[28]Ibid. p. 35
[29]Ibid. p. 70
[30]Tom Hussain, 'Arms Race between India and Pakistan Takes to Air', *The National,* 31 May 2011.
[31]Ibid.
[32]Lodi, 'Security Concerns of Pakistan', (

fear of extermination, fear of oppression".[33] It is the combination of uncertainty, ambiguous symbolism of weapons and the pervasiveness of fear that "constitutes the existential condition of human social interaction under anarchy".[34]

Meaning of "Security Paradox" and it Existence in Indo-Pakistan Relations

Jervis observed that "when states seek the ability to defend themselves, they get too much and too little".[35] It will be too much because their capacity to commit aggression will increase and too little because other States threatened by the actions will also increase their own security thereby making them less secure.[36] This arises under an existential condition of unresolvable uncertainty in international politics. It has been described as security paradox: "a situation in which two or more actors, seeking only to improve their own security, provoke through their words or actions an increase in mutual tension, resulting in less security all round".[37]

As mentioned, security dilemma consists of dilemma of interpretation and dilemma of response. Where the resolution of dilemma of interpretation "is based on misplaced suspicion regarding the motives and intentions of others" and in pursuance to that the dilemma of response is resolved in a "militarily confrontational manner" there is a risk for the creation of "a significant level of mutual hostility" when none was originally intended.[38] Where such unintended spiral mutual hostility exist a situation of security paradox has come into existence.[39]

In the context of Indo-Pakistan relationship, it may be said that no security dilemma exist since each state has historically been acting hostile to the other and that it is possible their military developments was for the purposes of defence only. But what appears relevant to our consideration is that because of their historical antecedents, mutual suspicion and mistrust, they have consistently resolved the dilemma of interpretation on military developments and postures in a fatalistic way even when unintended and proceeded to respond accordingly.

Although Jervis considered security paradox as security dilemma his comment is relevant. He stated that because of the problem of interpreting the other's intention, States "tend to assume the worst" in that States interpret other's intention to be "co-extensive" with such state's "capabilities", that

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[33]Booth and Wheeler, *Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*. P. 71

[34]Ibid. p. 78

[35]Jervis, 'The Spiral of International Insecurity'. P. 55

[36]Ibid.

[37]Booth and Wheeler, *Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*. P. 9

[38]Ibid. p. 5

[39]Ibid.

what a state can do to harm, hence in order to be safe, States resolve to buy as much weapons as possible.[40] A security paradox will be created where both sides obey "the same imperatives" and this "will be self-defeating to both States.[41]

Since in the 1960s, India and Pakistan continue to be in arms race.[42] Immediately after their 1971 war, India tested its nuclear weapons. Whether that test was meant to send a strong warning to Pakistan or for increasing India's security in the region where another nuclear power; China is present is arguable. Pakistan resolved this uncertainty in favour of India's intention to inflict more harm and commenced its own nuclear programme.[43] The climax was reached in 1998 when both States demonstrated to each other and to the world of their nuclear power capacity and their capacity to destroy each other instantly. The Indo-Pakistan continued search for defence has in the end makes them less secure to each other. This is likely to continue considering the role of Pakistan in the war against terror and its "defensive moves in conventional forces" which is likely to incite India which is in the quest for a superpower position to resolve that Pakistan may use such capability to settle the Kashmir question and hence India may take further steps to acquire more deterrent powers.[44]

Role of Security Dilemma Sensibility

Security dilemma sensibility is:

[A]n actor's intention and capacity to perceive the motives behind, and to show responsiveness towards, the potential complexity of the military intentions of others. In particular, it refers to the ability to understand the role that fear might play in their attitudes and behaviour, including, crucially, the role that one's own actions may play in provoking that fear.[45]

Although the Indo-Pakistan relationship has reached a dangerous level, mitigating the risk of nuclear war is possible. Approaches of considering the issue abound. While discussing the logics of insecurity three priori logics which help determine "the meaning, significance and implications of the security dilemma" have been identified.[46] The logical positions are the *fatalists*, the *mitigator* and the *transcender*.[47] The *fatalists* approach considers that in international politics, insecurity is inescapable because of the human nature and condition of anarchy, the approach of the *mitigator* is that insecurity can be mitigated or dampened down but not

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[40]Jervis, 'The Spiral of International Insecurity'. P. 55
[41]Ibid.
[42]Hussain, 'Arms Race between India and Pakistan Takes to Air'.
[43]Gordon Corera, *Shopping for Bombs: Nuclear Proliferation, Global Insecurity, and the Rise and Fall of the A.Q. Khan Network* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 2006).
[44]Booth and Wheeler, *Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*.
[45]Ibid. p. 7
[46]Ibid. p. 10
[47]Ibid.

completely eliminated while the *transcender's* logic is that "a radically new world" can be constructed by the human society which is capable of escaping dangers of the past including insecurity.[48]

The above logical positions can have profound impact on the Indo-Pakistan relationship. If we take the fatalist approach that we cannot escape insecurity in international politics a conclusion would be reached that the tense Indo-Pakistan security problem cannot be resolved simply because that is the existential condition of anarchy. Applying the *mitigator's* logic would mean there is the tendency of reducing de-escalation of the security problem. The last approach which is *transcender* is considered idealistic and may be close to impossible because it would be highly unlikely for Pakistan for example to abandon its claim on Kashmir.[49] In the circumstances, it may be opined that *mitigator's* logic is most likely to be successful in mitigating the situation.[50] Taking this as a starting point therefore, we can now turn to the issue of security dilemma sensibility.

Security dilemma sensibility can be used to significantly mitigate the security problem. Both States should strive to enter into the counter-fear of the other and be responsive to the fact that its postures and actions can have profound influence on the attitude or behaviour of the other. Both countries should strive to pursue policies aimed at reducing the tension in a manner which would not be considered hostile.[51]In this light, some achievements were recorded over time; for example, in 1972 after the Indo-Pakistan war, Shimla Summit aimed at lowering the tension between them was concluded. The summit contained measures to be taken especially on Kashmir dispute and India demonstrated a gesture of goodwill by realising over 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war.

Similarly, a year after the 1998 nuclear tests, India has shown some signs of security dilemma sensibility demonstrated by its Prime Minister's visit to Pakistan and meeting with Pakistan's leadership. That should be seen by Pakistan as a confidence building mechanism which should have the effect of eliminating one of the most serious concerns of Pakistan; its right to exist as a State.[52]

India has further shown security dilemma sensibility in the subsequent Lahore Declaration "which called for further discussions aimed at agreeing to a range of Confidence and Security Building Mechanism (CSBM), including the notification of ballistic missile tests, the prevention of

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[48]Ibid. p. 18

[49] Philipp Schweers, 'India and Pakistan: Trapped in a Security Paradox', *DIAS-Analysis,* /37 (December, 2008), 1-15.

[50]Ibid.

[51]Booth and Wheeler, *Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics*. P. 47

[52]Ibid. p. 284

incidents at sea, and the upgrading of hotlines, as well as new-found commitment to resolve the problem of Kashmir".[53] It could be said by these acts; India has shown signs of security dilemma sensibility on the security concerns of Pakistan. In turn, Pakistan should have reciprocated the gesture. If this was done, it will improve mutual confidence, build trust and de-escalate the tension but that did not happen.[54]Pakistan should have entered into the counter fear of India for example by demonstrating evidence of its commitment to addressing militants' incursions in Indian controlled Kashmir and its supposed support for Kashmir secessionists. Rather, Kargil operation took place.[55] The Kargil operation eroded the giant stride taken by India. Notwithstanding the resulting circumstance, the episode demonstrated that if both States were to enter into the counter-fear of the other, the problem of security could be reduced substantially. Another confidence building mechanism was the agreement on a "state of non-deployed non-weaponization of their nuclear weapons" which in terms of security dilemma sensibility "reduces mutual fear" in the relations between the States.[56]

The two States must strive to avoid interpreting every positive action of the other aimed at de-escalating the tension as deceptive. This is because as Jervis has stated "once a person has developed an image of the other-especially a hostile image of the other – ambiguous and even discrepant information will be assimilated to that image"[57]

Possible Mitigation with the Help of International Institutions

In a state of competing interest whether it would be possible for the Indo-Pakistan security problem to be resolved with the help of international institutions is arguable. It requires assessing the position of each with respect to the issues creating the tension. Two issues are relevant here: The Kashmir question and nuclear disarmament. The greatest stumbling block to resolving the security problem has been that of Kashmir. The Security Council has at various times intervened but without permanent success. Whether therefore international institutions can possibly mitigate the situation, it has been observed that at various times Pakistan has advocated for settling the issue through international institutions but consistently rejected by India.[58] India continues to insist on bilateralism, possibly relying on the Shimla agreement. The use of international institutions in situations where one of the parties considers it unacceptable is not promising.

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[53]Ibid.
[54]Ibid.
[55]Ibid. p. 285
[56]Schweers, 'India and Pakistan: Trapped in a Security Paradox', (p. 5)
[57]Jervis, 'The Spiral of International Insecurity'. P. 56
[58]Schweers, 'India and Pakistan: Trapped in a Security Paradox', (p. 6)

Arguably, international institutions may play a limited role. Both India and Pakistan are members of Asean Regional Forum (ARF). The Forum has the objective of fostering "constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern" as well as making "significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region"[59] Since becoming a member in 1996, India has been playing an active role in the organisation. The organisation could try to promote dialogue among the two States especially on confidence building and by encouraging the two to exercise security dilemma sensibility.

Regarding nuclear arms, assuming the competition is limited to the two States in the region, there is the possibility of international institutions mitigating the risk of nuclear war[60] "such as nuclear institution, a regime of norms and trust-building mechanisms like open-book-policy for reducing mistrust which should be enforced equally".[61] Unfortunately, the problem is that of "a particularly sensitive triangular context" in that India also possibly has China in mind therefore such process must include China, a situation which is unlikely because China also has US in mind.[62]

Indo-Pakistan relationship has shown some limited achievements in their bilateral negotiations, and although Shimla agreement is another source of conflict between the States, it continues to be the possible key to resolving the situation.

The Impact of Regime Type: Democracy vs. Autocracy

Research has established a relationship between regime type and peace. In this light, democratic peace theory States that democracies don't go to war with each other.[63] Further, if a conflict is between a democracy and non-democratic or between the non-democratic regimes there is a propensity that it will be resolved by military confrontation.[64] This is because certain constraints exist in a democratic state such as the existence of checks and balances as well as the division of power and the need for public debate to create support.[65] A democratic state has democratic norms/cultures which emphasise on negotiation and compromise.[66] Similarly, because of the participation of the public as well as the open debate, clear and reliable

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[59] www.ASEAN.org
[60] Ibid.
[61] Ibid.
[62] Ibid.
[63] Michael W. Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs', *Philosophy and Public Affairs,* 12/3 (1983). Pp. 207-8
[64] Gilat Levy and Ronny Razin, 'It Takes Two: An Explanation for the Democratic Peace', *Journal of the European Economic Association* 2/1 (2004), 1-29. At p. 1
[65] Ibid. p. 5
[66] Spencer R. Weart, *Never at War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

information about the intentions of liberal democratic States are sent to other States while on the other hand it is difficult to know the intention of autocratic leaders.[67]

Regarding the initiation of conflict, it has been argued that autocracies initiate conflicts against democracies more frequently than democracies do against autocracies.[68] Even in autocracy, military regimes are more particularly prone to conflict initiation than other types of autocracy and at the same time such regimes are more likely to be targeted in a war having other initiators.[69]

Research has also demonstrated the importance of perception. If a liberal democratic perceived another state as liberal, it will promote friendly relations with it and if it doesn't it will view it with suspicion.[70] Applying these situations to the regimes in India and Pakistan, at several points in history Pakistan has been ruled by military regimes and even when they are not on throne, they continue to exercise strong influence on the policies and actions of the civilian governments. The situation has been aptly described:

> Pakistan's colonial legacy, weak political parties, social conservatism, and outside influences have given its army an increasingly strong influence over the state. Even when civilians are in charge -- historically every ten years or so (1947-58, 1970-77, 1988-99, and since 2008) -- many responsibilities that are supposedly in the government's portfolio actually belong to the army: Afghanistan policy, the Kashmir strategy, and the nuclear program have been the purview of the generals for decades. And now the generals have become a force to be reckoned with in economic policy as well, because of their huge land holdings and vast military foundations and enterprises.[71]

This strong influence may have played a significant role in dragging the state into series of armed conflicts with India on the belief that military means could resolve the disputes. On the other hand, India validates the liberal-illiberal perception claim since it continues to perceive the non-democratic nature of Pakistan as a threat. This perception has been expressed long ago when in 1965 India publishes a pamphlet called, *The Paradox of India Pakistan Relations* wherein it stated:

> While looking forward to the day when the people of Pakistan may come to enjoy the same democratic rights as Indians do and a friendlier climate of Indo-Pakistan relations begins to develop, *the Government and people of India cannot afford to neglect the threat posed to India's territorial*

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[67]Levy and Razin, 'It Takes Two: An Explanation for the Democratic Peace', (

[68]Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, 'Identifying the Culprit: Democracy, Dictatorship, and Dispute Initiation', *American Political Science Review,* 97/2 (May, 2003), 333-37.

[69]Mark Peceny and Christopher K. Butler, 'The Conflict Behavior of Authoritarian Regimes', *International Politics,* 41/4 (2004), 565-81.

[70]John M. Owen, 'How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace', *International Security,* 19/2 (1994), 87-125.

[71]Christophe Jaffrelot, 'The Indian-Pakistani Divide: Why India Is Democratic and Pakistan Is Not', *Foreign Affairs,* (March/April 2011).

> *integrity by the irresponsible action of the communal-military clique which rules Pakistan today.*[72]

This may also have played a role in the conflict between them.

However, now that each state possesses nuclear power and assuming Pakistan continues to be a fully liberal democratic state, an interesting question has been asked that "even if India and Pakistan do not go to war with each other, can this be attributed to the democratic nature of their regimes or to other factors, like their all-but-acknowledged possession of nuclear weapons?[73]

Only time will tell.